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people" (p. 214). Recent studies testify to the continuing vitality of Hinduism and
some temple communities elsewhere in India. Jindel's book, with its richly
documented details, invites comparisons with studies elsewhere and points to
possible regional differences in religious change.
JAMES M. FREEMAN

Sanjose State University
Faith and Knowledge in Early Buddhism: An Analysis of the Contextual
Structures of an Arahant-Formula in the Majjhima-Nikiiya. BY JAN T.
ERGARDT. Leiden: E.J. Brill (Studies in the History of Religions (Supplements to Numen] XXXVII), 1977. xii, 182 pp. Bibliography, Index.
D.Gld. 48.00.
The avowed purpose of Jan T. Ergardt's study of faith and knowledge in early
Budhhism is to relate these two concepts to one of the Arahant formulas (denoted as
formula A) found in the 152 Suttas of the Majjhima Nikaya. The most frequently
found and evenly distributed of four such formulas is as follows: "Destroyed is birth,
brought to a close is the Brahma-faring, done is what was to be done, there is no
more of being such or such." (khf~a jati, v11sitafn brahmacariyam, katafn kara1pyam,
naparafnitthattaya). It is expanded in a formula, denoted as eA, by the sentence "In
one who is released, there is/was the knowledge that he is released" (vimuttasifn
vimuttam iti na~am hoti/ahosi).
Operating on the sound premise that a Sutta was intended to be heard or
understood in toto, the author proposes to investigate the place of faith and knowledge in the salvific process through a structural analysis of thirty-five Suttas in
which formulas A and eA are used. He hopes to demonstrate that such an analysis
will show that final emancipation is a cognitive experience, that freedom (vimutti)
and knowledge (na,µ) presuppose one another, that the underlying hypothesis behind the salvific process or the attainment of arahant-ship is the anatta concept, and
that anatta and nirvtiYfa must be fundamentally congruent concepts. Few students of
Theravada or early Buddhist thought would argue with these points; however,
Ergardt's study leading to these conclusions has some noteworthy flaws. Before
analyzing them, however, the author's methodology deserves further description.
Ergardt begins with an analysis of the quotation verbs of the Arahant formulapajanami, pajanama, pajanati, abbannasim, abbhannasi-to make the point that
knowledge of the Arahant formula is experiential and built on a distinct juncture in
a person's life. He then organizes his analysis according to those Suttas where the
formula is the starting point; where it is closely connected with parinibbayat; where
the focus is on the relationship between the formula and the Arahant-state; on
formula eA after various introductory phrases, e.g., "seeing thus"; and the same
formula after a discussion of various kamma-experiences, and after the stipulation of
certain preconditions, e.g., a Tathagatha arising in the world.
The author's analysis of each Sutta is, in fact, much like a summary outline in
terms of which he draws certain conclusions from the particular contexts surrounding the Arahant formula. For example, in the three Suttas where formula A is
the starting point, the structure or outline is: formula A, instruction and teaching
dhamma, knowing and seeing for oneself, release. The connecting thread Ergardt
finds through these common structures is the "verifiability of all knowledge through
one's personal experience" (p. 23). Although such Sutta outlines serve to structure
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various aspects of the interrelationship between process/path and goal, or on a more
philosophic level, between knowledge and reality, it is debatable whether this
method provides us with new insight into the soteriology and epistemology of early
Buddhist thought. In particular, if the author's task was to unpack the relationship
between faith and knowledge in the salvific process in early Buddhism, it seems that
the focus on the Arahant formula is too narrowly conceived. Such a concentration
, makes the relationship between faith and knowledge secondary at best.
A further question might profitably be raised about structural analyses of Sutta
materials. While the systematic unfolding of the development ofSutta is important,
there may also be a deeper grammar, different structural and/or symbohc levels of
meaning that should also be unpacked. Here our studies will benefit from the
insights of literary and philosophical hermeneutics. It is precisely at this point that
this reviewer finds some confusion in Ergardt's interpretation of anatta. At times he
states that this key concept is a predisposition verified in meditation, whereas
elsewhere he takes an annihilationist view that anatta means the extinction of the life
processes of the Arahant (p. 157).
Lack of clarity appears on other fronts, in some instances stemming from very
awkward sentences, e.g., "If someone claims to have perfect knowledge, and if
someone claims that he knows the status of an Arahant, but does not really know it,
the Buddha sees it as his duty to teach dhamma, and this teaching is further
described" (p. 13). Of more serious consequence is the confusion over the relationship between experience, knowledge, and verbal statements, signs or concepts. It is
unclear whether Ergardt thinks that statements are experienced and, hence, verified,
or whether a claim like the Arahant formula is a verbal expression of knowledge
gained through personal experience. This distinction is not clearly made and maintained. Finally, while I applaud Ergardt's position that we should study Sutta texts
in toto because that is how they were heard and learned, one of his major reasons for
this position seems rather odd: namely, that because the Suttas he investigated were
addressed to an educated elite, we should expect there to be a correlation between
the description of the religious goal and the concept of personality. In my opinion,
normative rather than contextual questions are at issue here.
Jan T. Ergardt's book does provide a helpful view of the structure of the salvific
process in the Majjhima Nikaya, and the relationship of the Arahant formula to it.
His determination to analyze whole texts is a noble one, even though this reviewer
believes that the method was not adequately exploited and that there are some
noteworthy unresolved confusions in the book.
DONALD K. SWEARER
Swarthmore Cotlege

The End and the Beginning: Pakistan 1969-1971. BY HERBERT FELDMAN.
London: Oxford University Press, 1975. xi, 210 pp. Appendixes, Index.
$14.50.
This book, covering the three most turbulent years of Pakistan's political
history, is a part of a trilogy by the author. In the first two chapters, the author
describes the return of martial law and the shift of power from the Ayub regime to
the Yahya-led junta. Later in the book, he deals with the political development at
the center and in the two parts of Pakistan. The last four chapters are devoted to the
Pakistani military crackdown, the Indian involvement and the December War,

